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PATENT CLAIM INTERPRETATION AND INFORMATION COSTS 
by 
Christopher A. Cotropia • 
The concept of invention is crucial to patent law. Inventions of patentable 
quality are what the patent system is trying to encourage. In order to 
provide this incentive to produce such inventions, the patent system must 
provide protection for the invention. The problem the patent system runs 
into is that inventions are dijjicult to define-the dijjiculty stemming in 
part from the intangible nature of inventions. As a result, patent law 
encounters an information cost problem. Everyone in the patent system 
needs information about the invention, but the invention's intangibleness 
makes this information costly to produce, collect, and comprehend. 
Patent law responds by e;iforcing certain information producing rules. 
These information producing rules do not completely rectify the 
information cost problem in defining the edges of patent protection. The 
patent claim, while meant to inform everyone about the boundaries of the 
grant of exclusivity, must be interpreted to be of any use. This Article first 
addresses the information cost issues presented by the process of 
interpreting the patent claim. It then takes a specific look at the 
information costs generated when using two different information tools 
during claim interpretation-the specification and external definitional 
sources such as dictionaries. This Article concludes that full use of the 
specification early in the claim interpretation process minimizes 
information costs. It further concludes that any interpretation 
methodology should consider the information costs it imposes on both the 
patentee and any patent observer, keeping in mind the invention-specific 
information patent law already requires to be produced. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Almost ten years ago, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal 
Circuit issued an en bane decision in Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 
where it held that matters of patent claim interpretation were in the sole 
province of the court, not the jury. 1 A year later, the Supreme Court affirmed 
the Federal Circuit's decision. These decisions have since incited a wealth of 
jurisprudence from the Federal Circuit on the issue of claim interpretation-
more particularly, on the method used to interpret claim terms. Issues such as 
what sources are to be considered and how these sources should be used when 
defining claim terms form the heart of the current debate on the proper 
methodology for courts to employ. The Federal Circuit recently took the 
methodology issue en bane, in Phillips v. A WH Corp., to hopefully adopt a 
single approach to claim interpretation.3 With over ten years of rich 
jurisprudence in the area, and a recent en bane decision focused on the issue, 
the question as to the proper method for interpreting claims is ripe for 
answering. 
To better answer this question, the subject to be defined-the invention-
needs to be examined. The concept of invention is crucial to patent law. 
Inventions of patentable quality are what the patent system is trying to 
encourage. And in order to provide this incentive to produce such inventions, 
the patent system must provide protection for the invention. Furthermore, 
everyone in the patent system must know the contours of the protected 
invention to make determinations on issues of the invention's infringement and 
validity. The problem the patent system runs into is that inventions are difficult 
to define-the difficulty stemming in part from the intangible nature of 
inventions. Inventions are ideas, information, and concepts. While an invention 
has physical manifestations, these are merely examples of the invention. An 
1 52 F.3d 967, 976 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en bane), aff'd, 517 U.S. 370 (1996). 
2 Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 373-74 (1996). 
3 376 F.3d 1382, 1382-83 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (en bane) (per curiam) ("Phillips II"). 
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invention's inherent lack of physicality, lack of "thingness," makes it tough for 
any observer to comprehend. 
But for the patent system to work, the invention, particularly its edges, 
must be defined and this definition communicated to all of those involved. 
Patent law, therefore, encounters an information cost problem. Everyone in the 
patent system needs information about the invention, but the invention's 
intangibleness makes this information costly to produce, collect, and 
comprehend. Both the inventor and any observer will expend energy and 
resources in understanding the patented invention. Patent law responds to this 
situation by creating certain information producing rules. These rules are 
located in 35 U.S.C. § 112 and dictate the creation of the patent document 
itself. The onus is placed on the patentee to provide a specification and one or 
more claims for the whole world to see. The specification must include a 
description of the invention, how to make and use the invention, and any best 
way of practicing the invention known to the inventor. The patent must also 
include one or more claims that specify the borders of the invention the 
patentee wishes to protect. 
Another problem is encountered because the patent claim does not get the 
patent system all the way there. The patent claim, while meant to inform 
everyone about the boundaries of the grant of exclusivity, must be interpreted 
to be of any use. Claim interpretation, also known as claim construction, places 
the claims in context to resolve a given dispute-either as to the claim's 
infringement by an allegedly infringing product or process or as to the claim's 
validity. Here the jurisprudence sparked by the Federal Circuit's and Supreme 
Court's decisions in Markman enters the picture. The current questions 
regarding interpretation focus on the use of different informational sources, 
such as the specification and definitional sources outside the patent. These 
questions present information cost issues of their own--costs associated with 
the production, collection, and processing of this information in order to define 
the exact area of exclusivity given by the patent claim. The lower the 
information costs incurred during this process, the easier it is for any actor in 
the patent system to comprehend the most crucial aspect of a patent-its scope 
of exclusivity. 
This Article addresses the information cost issues presented by the process 
of interpreting the claimed invention. It takes a specific look at the information 
costs generated when using two different information tools-the specification 
and external definitional sources such as dictionaries. This Article concludes 
that full use of the specification early in the claim interpretation process 
minimizes information costs. The information in the specification is already 
tailored to and in context with the claim under interpretation. In addition, the 
specification provides invention-specific information in a low cost fashion and 
includes information that caters to an interpreter's familiarity and ease with 
understanding tangible "things." In contrast, a claim interpretation 
methodology that employs a heavy presumption in favor of external 
definitional sources introduces information costs. The selection and processing 
of these definitional sources can be extremely costly. Furthermore, such an 
approach squanders the cost savings gained by using the whole specification 
early in the interpretation process. This Article further concludes that any 
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interpretation methodology should consider the information costs it imposes on 
both the patentee and any patent observer, keeping in mind the invention-
specific information patent Jaw already requires to be produced. 
II. THE "INVENTION,'' INTANGIBLENESS, AND RELATED 
INFORMATION COSTS 
A. Need to Define the Invention 
Patent Jaw is classically viewed as creating an incentive to invent.4 This 
incentive is provided by giving the inventor exclusive control over her 
invention. 5 Exclusivity is needed because inventions are similar to public goods 
in that their consumption is not inherently exclusive.6 Like public goods, 
inventions, being essentially ideas, can be consumed by many at the same time 
without any depletion. Overuse of an idea does not exhaust the idea.7 And like 
public goods, the use of an invention is nonrivalrous in that one individual's 
use does not interfere with another's simultaneous use of the invention. The 
public goods nature of an invention makes it difficult, if not impossible, for the 
inventor to exclude others from using her invention. 8 
To add to this lack of inherent control over the invention, the inventive 
concept, once it is disclosed to the public, is easily copied and disseminated.9 
4 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 
480--81 (1974) ("The patent laws promote this progress by offering a right of exclusion for a 
limited period as an incentive to inventors to risk the often enormous costs in terms of time, 
research, and development."); Mark A. Lemley, Ex Ante versus Ex Post Justifications for 
Intellectual Property, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 129, 129-30 (2004) (referring to the incentive to 
invent as the "ex ante justification" for intellectual property law). 
The incentive to invent theory is not the only theory of patent law. See, e.g., Edmund W. 
Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 J.L. & ECON. 265, 276-78 (1977) 
(describing the prospect theory of patents-an ex post patent theory). 
5 See Mark A. Lemley, The Economics of Improvement in Intellectual Property Law, 
75 TEX. L. REv. 989, 995-96 (1997) (noting that by giving the inventor "control over the use 
and distribution of their ideas," intellectual property law "encourage[s) them to invest 
efficiently in the production ofnew ideas and works of authorship"). 
6 See Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 VA. L. REV. 
1575, 1604--05 (Nov. 2003) (indicating that "information is a public good for which 
consumption is nonrivalrous-that is, one person's use of the information does not deprive 
others of the ability to use it"). 
7 But see ROBERT P. MERGES ET AL., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE NEW 
TECHNOLOGICAL AGE 12 n.2 (3d ed. 2003) (noting that certain second-order distorting 
effects may lead to resource depletion-that is, of resources consumed by the 
implementation of the invention). 
8 See Joseph Scott Miller, Building a Better Bounty: Litigation-Stage Rewards for 
Defeating Patents, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 667, 680--81 (2004) (discussing the "free rider 
problem" the public good nature of invention creates and how it "undercut[s) an inventor's 
incentive to risk inventing"). 
9 See Katherine J. Strandburg, What Does the Public Get? Experimental Use and the 
Patent Bargain, 2004 WIS. L. REV. 81, I 04--05 ("The production of patentable inventions is 
understood to be different from other commercial activity because the investment in new 
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Others can obtain the benefits of the inventor's work without needing to expend 
the same research and development costs spent by the inventor. 10 Others can 
compete with the inventor without incurring these initial sunk costs. If an 
inventor decides to invent, she is unlikely to be able to demand the price 
necessary to recoup her research and development costs because others, who 
did not have to bear those costs, will drive the price down. Faced with such a 
scenario, a potential inventor will likely not invent, because the post-invention 
environment is not perceived as conducive to recovery of her initial costs. 
Without some type of exclusive control, patentable inventions will be under-
produced. 11 
Patent law provides an incentive to invent by giving the inventor the 
ability to exclude these would-be competitors. 12 Patent law allows the inventor 
to erect a fence around her invention and control its use. The patent system 
gives the inventor exclusivity over her invention, allowing her to prevent others 
from producing or implementing the invention at a lower cost. 13 The inventor is 
then free to charge the price necessary to recover her research and development 
costs. 
In order to provide the inventor exclusivity over the invention and create 
an incentive to invent, patent law must first define the boundaries of this 
exclusivity. Barriers must be erected to establish what the inventor gains 
exclusive control over. Patent law must identify what the invention is, and, 
more particularly, its exact contours. Such a definition is needed for substantive 
determinations-to enact particular patent policies and balance the level of 
incentive to invent against the need for dissemination of information. But 
perhaps more fundamentally, lines must be drawn simply to inform the inventor 
ideas, unlike the investment in capital equipment or materials, is assumed to be appropriable 
by competitors at very little expense."). 
10 See Gideon Parchomovsky & Peter Siegelman, Towards an Integrated Theory of 
Intellectual Property, 88 VA. L. REv. 1455, 1466--67 (2002) (stating that "absent legal 
protection, competitors would copy such works without incurring the initial costs of 
producing them [and, therefore,] [u]nauthorized reproduction would drive down the market 
price to the cost of copying, original authors and inventors would not be able to recover their 
expenditures on authorship and R&D, and, as a result, too few inventions and expressive 
works would be created"). 
11 There are, notably, other incentives to produce inventions. See, e.g., Glynn S. 
Lunney, Jr., Patent Law, the Federal Circuit, and the Supreme Court: A Quiet Revolution, 
11 SUP. CT. ECON. REv. I, 39 (2004) ("[E]ven in the absence of exclusive rights to the 
intangible information component of an innovative product, the private market, operating 
against a background of property rights in tangible things, will generate some incentive for 
innovation."). Patent law based incentives to invent are still needed, however, to ensure that 
inventions are created where the "social value exceeds their social costs" but are 
"unprofitable based upon the rents available from tangible property rights alone." Id. 
12 See Lemley, supra note 5, at 995-96. Notably, patent law can only provide a 
perception that the patentee will be able to recover costs. See Lemley, supra note 4, at 129-
30; WESLEY M. COHEN ET. AL.; PROTECTING THEIR INTELLECTUAL ASSETS: APPROPRIABILITY 
CONDITIONS AND WHY U.S. MANUFACTURING FIRMS PATENT (OR NOT) 3 n.4 (Nat'! Bureau of 
Econ. Research, Working Paper 7552, 2000), http://www.nber.org/ papers/w7552 (noting 
that it is the "expectation" of patent law facilitating the generation of "ex post rents" that 
provides the incentive to invent). 
13 See Lemley, supra note 4, at 129-30; COHEN ET AL., supra note 12, at 3 n.4. 
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and the public where the area of protection begins and ends. Definition of the 
protected invention is needed in patent law for definition's sake. The patent 
system cannot give the inventor effective control over her invention if it cannot 
delineate what the inventor gets control over. 
For the patent system's award of exclusivity and control over the invention 
to operate properly, all parts of the patent process and all actors who come in 
contact with the patent must be able to identify the invention being protected. 
From the beginning, the invention for which protection is sought must be 
identified. The inventor, 14 when she goes to her patent attorney, needs to 
understand the contours of the invention over which the patent application will 
give her protection. This understanding allows her to make determinations as to 
whether the defined invention is what she actually invented and whether the 
scope of protection is broad enough to make a patent worth pursuing. 15 The 
patent attorney also needs. to know the invention's delineations. The patent 
attorney must, throughout the patent application process, make determinations 
regarding the invention as compared to prior art and the specification. 16 
Without knowing what the invention is for which protection is sought, the 
patent attorney cannot make informed decisions regarding the novelty, utility, 
or nonobviousness of the invention. The same holds true for the patent 
examiner-the administrative official in the United States Patent and 
Trademark Office ("USPTO"}-who reviews the application to determine 
whether the invention is patentable and worthy of patent protection. In order to 
properly make such a determination, the patent examiner must also know what 
the invention is for which the inventor seeks exclusivity. 17 
The need for a definition of the patented invention continues after the 
patent application leaves the USPTO as an issued patent. The patentee must 
know the scope of her invention that is protected so she can understand the 
breadth of the market over which she has exclusivity. 18 This knowledge allows 
the incentive structure of the patent system to be completed-identifying the 
types of products the inventor can produce and sell exclusively in order to 
recoup her initial research and development costs. Her knowledge of the 
protected invention also allows her to know from whom she can reasonably 
14 This Article will also refer to an inventor who applies for a patent as a "patent 
applicant." An inventor whose patent is issued is also referred to as the "patentee." The 
patent may be assigned to others, who are then considered the patent owner or patent holder. 
See 35 U.S.C. § 261 (2000) (describing ownership and assignment in patent law). 
15 See 35 U.S.C. § 115 (2000) (requiring the patent applicant to take an oath that "he 
believes himself to be the original and first inventor of the process, machine, manufacture, or 
composition of matter, or improvement thereof, for which he solicits a patent"). 
16 See 37 C.F.R. § l.56 (2003) (noting the requirements on patent attorneys to disclose 
material related to an invention's patentability). 
17 See. e.g., In re Bigio, 381F.3d1320, 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (indicating that the patent 
examiner first must understand the invention under examination before making patentability 
determinations). 
18 See 35 U.S.C. § 27l(a) (2000) (noting that "whoever without authority makes, uses, 
offers to sell, or sells any patented invention, within the United States or imports into the 
United States any patented invention during the term of the patent therefor, infringes the 
patent"). 
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request royalties or with whom she can enter into licensing deals. The 
inventor's continuing knowledge of the scope of exclusivity is needed to 
maintain effective control over her invention. The same knowledge is needed 
for parties other than the patent holder-those who compete with the inventor 
or whom the patentee has licensed or assigned the patent. 19 A competitor might 
also want to know the contours of the protected invention so that they can 
design around or improve upon the invention.20 Other members of the public 
who might want to invest in the patent holder's company or simply buy the 
patent also need to know the range of exclusivity the patent provides in order to 
assess the value the patent produces. All of these observers want to know the 
exact invention the patent protects to determine the characteristics and breadth 
of the market over which the patent provides exclusivity.21 
Finally, courts need to know the invention being Erotected in order to 
resolve disputes over the infringement of the patent. A patent provides 
exclusivity over the invention, and those who practice the invention without the 
patent holder's approval are said to infringe.23 In order to make a determination 
of infringement, the accused product or process is evaluated to see if it uses all 
of the elements, including equivalents, of the patented invention.24 The 
allegedly infringing product or process is not compared to a commercial 
embodiment of the invention, but the patented invention itself.25 To make a 
decision on infringement, a court must first understand the scope of the 
invention the patent protects.26 In order for the patent holder to enforce her 
exclusivity over the patented invention, a court must comprehend the breadth of 
that exclusivity. 
19 These parties can collectively be referred to as "observers," borrowing a term from 
Long's work. See Clarisa Long, Information Costs in Patent and Copyright, 90 VA. L. REV. 
465, 489-95 (2004) (dividing up these observers of the patent into three groups-avoiders, 
transactors, and builders). 
20 The improvement upon and designing around of patented inventions is a 
fundamental policy in patent law. See Craig Allen Nard, A Theory of Claim Interpretation, 
14 HARV. J.L. & TECH. I, 36--43 (2000). 
21 These observers may also want to know the contours of the invention that is 
protected to make a determination as to the validity of a patent grant on such an invention. 
22 See Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 373-74 (1996) (noting 
that to resolve a question of infringement, the scope of the protected invention must first be 
ascertained). 
23 See 35 U.S.C. § 27l(a) (2000). 
24 See Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 732 
(2002) ("The scope of a patent is not limited to its literal terms but instead embraces all 
equivalents to the claims described.") (citing Winans v. Denmead, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 330, 
347, 14 L.Ed 714 (1854)). 
25 See, e.g., SRI Int'! v. Matsushita Elec. Corp. of Am., 775 F.2d 1107, 1121 (Fed. Cir. 
1985). 
26 See Alloc, Inc. v. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 342 F.3d 1361, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2003). Similar 
determinations as to the patented subject matter must also be made to resolve issues of 
invalidity. See Smiths Indus. Med. Sys., Inc. v. Vital Signs, Inc., 183 F.3d 1347, 1353 (Fed. 
Cir. 1999). 
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B. Intangibleness of the Invention 
The problem the patent system encounters is that defining the invention is 
not that simple. The difficulty in definition stems, at least in part, from the 
characteristics that comprise an invention. An invention is essentially 
information representing an idea in the inventor's head. The prototypical 
invention-the widget-is not the physical widget itself, but the idea of the 
widget.27 An inventive idea usually identifies a problem to be solved and how 
to solve it.28 It is comprised of an underlying concept, a function, and, in some 
cases, a particular purpose. The idea cannot be identified by sight, touch, or 
smell. There are physical manifestations of this information-words on a page 
describing the invention or a working model exemplifying the information-
but the invention at its core, the invented widget for example, is an idea with no 
inherent physical forrn. 29 There is nothing tangible that one can identify as 
being the "widget invention." One can only actually see examples or 
embodiments of the widget invention. 
Inventions are intangible.30 Inventions lack a "thingness."31 There is no 
thing in real space that can be identified as the invention. The intangibleness of 
inventions is the reason inventions can be equated to public goods. An 
invention can be in two places at the same time. If an invention was a physical 
thing, then its use would be inherently rivalrous. An invention's lack of 
thingness means that it has no real world boundaries to aid in its definition.32 
There is nothing one can see or touch to help one understand the extent of the 
invention. The intangibleness of an invention makes it hard to comprehend and 
particularly difficult to recognize its borders. Inventions lack the attributes that 
make the exclusivity of real and personal property easy to grasp.33 
27 See Timothy P. Terrell & Jane S. Smith, Publicity, Liberty, and Intellectual 
Property: A Conceptual and Economic Analysis of the Inheritability Issue, 34 EMORY L.J. 1, 
30-32 (1985) (noting that intellectual property rights are "in essence claims against the 
whole world regarding some creative idea, one that does not depend on any particular 
tangible paper and ink or bits of metal and plastic"). 
28 Seel WILLIAM C. ROBINSON, THE LAW OF PATENTS FOR USEFUL INVENTIONS§§ 86-
87 (1890). 
29 See Craig Allen Nard, Certainty, Fence Building, and the Useful Arts, 74 IND. L.J. 
759, 760 (1999) (noting that it is "difficult to describe the particulars of an abstract 
concept"). 
30 See David Lange, Reimagining the Public Domain, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 463, 
467 (2003); Wendy J. Gordon, An Inquiry into the Merits of Copyright: The Challenges of 
Consistency, Consent, and Encouragement Theory, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1343, 1379-80 (1989); 
Jessica Litman, The Public Domain, 39 EMORY L.J. 965, 971 (1990) (noting that intellectual 
property "lacks the tangible qualities associated with real property"); Terrell & Smith, supra 
note 27, at 30-32; David Lange, Recognizing the Public Domain, 44 LAW & CONTEMP. 
PROBS., Autumn 1981, at 147, 147. 
31 See Gordon, supra note 30, at 13 79-80 (discussing the lack of thingness of creative 
expression). 
32 See Long, supra note 19, at 473-74. 
33 See id. at 482-85 (comparing the lack of familiarity and reductionism of intellectual 
goods to the opposite in real property); Terrell & Smith, supra note 27, at 31-32. 
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Real and personal property have physical boundaries that help one define 
and understand them. 34 Real property has geographical demarcations 
identifying the limits of its scope.3 The boundaries of a piece of real property 
may be conveyed by a fence or barbed wire. Real property may also be defined 
in a deed by noting the latitude and longitude of the property's borders. 
Personal property is also often defined by the tangible qualities of the item 
itself. The physical attributes of a diamond ring-its size, cut, clarity, and any 
imperfections-help one understand the exact "ring" being identified. The 
same is true of a jacket someone leaves at a restaurant. That piece of personal 
property is not recognized by an abstract concept-for example something that 
keeps one warm-but by the physical characteristics of the jacket-its size, 
shape, color, and condition. These tangibles of real and physical property help 
individuals comprehend and recognize the extent of exclusivity over that piece 
of property.36 The boundaries of the land or jacket can be identified and 
understood by both its owner and the public.37 
In contrast, the public cannot use its familiarity with real space to help it 
understand the extent of an invention. 38 The concepts and functions that make 
up an invention are tougher for people to comprehend than something tangible, 
particularly when trying to define the invention's borders. The physical world 
markers that individuals rely upon to help identify real and personal property 
are not there to assist in defining inventions. Therefore, while inventions 
clearly need to be defined for the patent system to operate, and the incentive to 
invent to be instituted, the process of defining inventions is a difficult one due, 
in part, to the intangibleness of inventions. 
C. Information Costs Intangibleness Creates 
In order to better understand or define something, one must collect 
information about it and process that information. In addition, someone must 
produce and provide the information to be consumed. "Information costs" are 
those costs incurred when generating, obtaining, and comprehending 
information.39 Three activities generate these costs: the production of 
information, the finding of that information, and the actual processing and 
34 See Gordon, supra note 30, at 1379; see also Long, supra note 19, at 472-74. 
35 See Gordon, supra note 30, at 1380 (identifying such physical demarcations 
surrounding real property). 
36 See Long, supra note 19, at 476-77, 482. 
37 This statement oversimplifies things. There are still certain boundaries on real or 
personal property that are not inherently tangible-such as easements and liens-and 
therefore tougher to comprehend for all involved individuals. And property, the legal 
concept, is itself intangible. See Adam Mossoff, What is Property? Putting the Pieces Back 
Together, 45 Aruz. L. REv. 371, 413-15 (2003). 
38 See Long, supra note 19, at 482-85 (discussing the absence of familiarity when 
trying to understand inventions). 
39 See Henry E. Smith, Exclusion and Property Rules in the Law of Nuisance, 90 VA. L. 
REv. 965, 970-71 (2004) ("Information costs include the costs of generating information 
about rights in the process of delineating and publicizing them, as well as the costs incurred 
by third parties in processing information about the scope, nature, and validity of those 
rights."). 
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comprehension of that information. Information costs are particularly 
encountered when trying to understand a legal rule or the subject of that rule. 
Effort and expense are put forth when trying to comprehend the contours of 
legal rules and the items controlled by those legal rules. These costs of 
producing, obtaining, and processing information are incurred in many 
different areas of the law. But information costs are a particular issue when 
considering intellectual property regimes like the patent system.40 Specifically 
when defining an invention, the information costs involved are those expended 
to understand the item subject to the patent laws, not the patent laws that 
h . . 41 govern t e mventton. 
The intangibleness of an invention generates information costs. Significant 
amounts of time and energy can be expended to obtain enough information 
about the invention to understand it.42 To understand the edges of an invention 
involves even higher information costs.43 One cannot rely on real space 
relations to provide information about an invention. The intangibleness of an 
invention makes determining and measuring its boundaries difficult because an 
observer cannot use her usual property measuring tools.44 One must do more 
than simply observe the "thing" in real space and note its physical 
characteristics. The invention's attributes must first be identified and then 
digested to appreciate the full extent of the invention. In addition, there are 
costs associated with the production of invention information for processing. 
Therefore, with these heightened barriers to comprehension caused by the 
invention's lack of thingness, the information costs of defining the invention 
rise accordingly. 
Again, to provide contrast, the information costs expended to comprehend 
the boundaries of real or personal property are considerably lower. One can 
easily collect information on real or personal property in order to define them. 
Real property is definable by its boundaries associated with certain real-space 
locations.45 Fences or geographical markers can quickly and effectively convey 
40 See, e.g., Long, supra note 19 (discussing patent law in an information costs 
context). 
41 Accordingly, this Article, and the whole school of claim interpretation, focuses on 
what is being defined-the invention-as opposed to the laws under which that invention is 
governed. There can, however, be an overlap of the two, when certain patent requirements 
affect how a claim is interpreted. See, e.g., SmithKline Diagnostics, Inc. v. Helena Labs. 
Corp., 859 F.2d 878, 882 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (noting that patent claims must be interpreted to 
be valid-to meet the requirements of patentability under 35 U.S.C. §§ 101-103, 112 
(2000); noting that in those circumstances, information costs in defining the invention 
include the costs in understanding the laws governing patentability). 
42 See Long, supra note 19, at 476-77. 
43 See id. at 471 (noting how usually "property rights remain ambiguous around the 
edges"). 
44 See id. at 483, 536-38 ("Information costs are more significant in intellectual 
property than in real property and personal property law. Because they are intangible, 
determining and measuring the boundaries of intellectual goods are more difficult than 
determining and measuring the boundaries of real property."); see also Richard A. Epstein, 
Property Rights in cDNA Sequences: A New Resident for the Public Domain, 3 U. CHI. L. 
SCH. ROUNDTABLE 575, 576 (1996) (noting how difficult it is to define an invention). 
45 See Gordon, supra note 30, at 1378-80. 
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the extent of a piece of real property. Similar information on personal property 
is simple to obtain. A diamond ring can be touched, worn, and observed-
providing the observer with instant and easily consumable information 
identifying the article of personal property. The familiarity people have with 
physical things aids in the efficient processing of information regarding that 
piece of property.46 There is also some reductionism at work that decreases 
information costs, where the actual object itself and the legal concept of 
property become one.47 The diamond ring is both a diamond ring and a piece of 
personal property, and the attributes that define the ring also define it as a piece 
of property. The personal property aspects of the ring can become more 
complicated when dealing with questions of ownership and title, for example, 
but the comprehension of the property at issue is easier when it is so intimately 
tied to a physical manifestation. The information is also self-producing-the 
thing provides the information by simply being a thing without any additional 
costs. 
The definition of the invention-so crucial to the operation of patent 
law--can therefore be examined from the perspective of information costs.48 
Inventions, being intangible, have the potential of imposing extremely high 
information costs on both the patent holder and the public.49 Any actor in the 
patent process, of which there are many, must understand the extent of the 
protected invention.50 The process of comprehension begins with defining the 
patented invention, which is difficult due to its intangible nature. The patent 
system must respond by using information-cost reducing mechanisms to 
provide invention-specific information in a low cost manner. Patent law must 
also ease the costs associated with the ultimate comprehension of the exact 
contours of exclusivity over the invention. And, when trying to minimize 
information costs, patent law should consider the net information costs incurred 
by the inventor and the public in providing, obtaining, and comprehending 
invention information.51 Patent law's main tool for reducing these information 
costs is the publicly available patent document itself.52 
III. PATENT LA W'S INFORMATION PRODUCING RULES 
In response to the need to both provide information regarding the 
invention and ultimately define the exact invention the patent protects, patent 
46 See Long, supra note I 9, at 482-87. 
47 Again, this is not completely true-there are boundaries to the property rights over 
real and personal property that are not readily visible and the property rights themselves are 
intangible. See supra note 37. 
48 Such an examination has been performed before by Long, but not the specific one 
this Article takes-focusing on information costs associated with claim interpretation. Sei. 
e.g., Long, supra note 19. 
49 See id. at 467-68 (noting some of the information cost problems patent and copyright 
law address). 
50 See supra Part II.A. 
51 See Long, supra note 19, at 496-99 (discussing the allocation of informational 
burdens on both the inventor and observers). 
52 See 35 U.S.C. § 112, paras. 1-2 (2000). 
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law invokes rules that require the production of information regarding the 
invention. These patent doctrines center on the publicly available patent 
document and requirements on the patent applicant-the inventor-to put 
certain invention-specific information in the patent. These information 
producing rules focus on the two basic parts of the patent document-the 
specification53 and the claims. 54 Each of these parts plays a specific role in 
providing everyone with invention-specific information. 
A. Specification-Related Information Producing Rules 
Three requirements govern the type of information an inventor must put in 
the specification.55 The specification must include a written description of the 
invention the inventor wishes to protect. The specification must also include an 
enabling description of the invention-how to make and use the invention. 
Finally, the specification must set forth the best mode of practicing the 
invention. All three of these requirements place the burden on the inventor to 
produce and publicly provide information regarding her invention.56 
Patent law requires that the specification include a written description of 
the patented invention. This written description requirement necessitates that 
the patentee describe the patented invention in the specification. 57 The patentee 
must describe her invention in enough detail to convey to a person of ordinary 
skill in the art,58 with reasonable clarity, that the inventor was in possession of 
the invention on the patent's filing date.59 The written description requirement 
ensures that the specification describes the universe of inventions for which the 
patentee may decide to ask for exclusivity.60 The written description 
requirement prevents the patentee from patenting something she has not 
demonstrated to the public that she has invented by the patent's filing date. The 
53 The specification is also referred to as the "written description," because technically 
the specification includes the patent claims. See 35 U.S.C. § 112, paras. 1-2; Hester Indus., 
Inc. v. Stein, Inc., 142 F.3d 1472, 1483 (Fed. Cir. 1998). For purposes of this Article, the 
term "specification" will be used to refer to all parts of the patent document other than the 
claims. 
54 The prosecution history-the administrative record produced during the procurement 
of the patent-also necessarily contains information regarding the invention. See Vitronics 
Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1582-83 (Fed. Cir. 1996). 
55 See 35 U.S.C. § 112, para. l. 
56 These requirements are meant, in part, to make the inventor meet her part of patent 
law's quid pro quo-exclusivity over the invention in exchange for public disclosure of the 
invention. See Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 484 (1974). 
57 See 35 U.S.C. § 112, para. l ("The specification shall contain a written description of 
the invention."); Vas-Cath, Inc. v. Mahurkar, 935 F.2d 1555, 1562-63 (Fed. Cir. 1991). 
58 A person having ordinary skill in the art is the intended audience of a patent. See In 
re Ruschig, 379 F.2d 990, 996 (C.C.P.A. 1967). 
59 See Moba, B.V. v. Diamond Automation, Inc., 325 F.3d 1306, 1320--21 (Fed. Cir. 
2003); Ralston Purina Co. v. Far-Mar-Co, Inc., 772 F.2d 1570, 1575 (Fed. Cir. 1985); In re 
Kaslow, 707 F.2d 1366, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 1983). 
60 See Vas-Cath, Inc., 935 F.2d at 1560-62. The written description requirement was 
initially meant to ensure the specification defined the patented invention. See Evans v. Eaton, 
20 U.S. (7 Wheat) 356, 430--33 (1822). However, as will be discussed below, a patent's 
claims have taken over this task. 
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written description requirement "guards against the inventor's overreaching" by 
having the specification describe the full breadth of her "original creation" at 
the time of filing. 61 "Although [the patentee] does not have to describe exactly 
the subject matter claimed, ... the description must clearly allow persons of 
ordinary skill in the art to recognize that [the patentee] invented what is 
claimed."62 
The written description requirement, therefore, requires the patentee to 
provide the public with certain invention-specific information. The patentee 
must put enough information in the specification to show that she was in 
possession of the patented invention as of the filing date.63 As a result, the 
specification teaches the public about what the patentee considers to be her 
invention. The written description requirement also supplies a person of 
ordinary skill in the art with the boundaries of what subject matter the patentee 
h . d 64 may assert s e mvente . 
Patent law also requires the inventor to describe how to make and use the 
invention in the specification.65 The specification must enable the invention by 
disclosing "the manner and process of making and using [the invention], in 
such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the 
art to which [the invention] pertains, or with which [the invention] is most 
nearly connected, to make and use the same .... "66 The specification must 
provide the public with enough information to enable the practice of the 
invention.67 While the specification need not disclose every possible 
embodiment of the invention, the specification must provide enough detail to 
enable a person of ordinary skill in the art to practice the full breadth of what 
the patentee wishes to protect. 68 The teachings can require some 
experimentation on the part of skilled artisans, as long as the required amount is 
not undue.69 
The enablement requirement is another information producing rule that 
compels the patentee to provide even more information about the invention in 
the specification. In order to be enabling, the specification must include enough 
technical information, and possibly drawin~s, to show how a skilled artisan can 
actually implement the claimed invention. 0 The specification may include a 
list of materials used to make the invention, instructions on how to operate the 
invention, or descriptions of environments in which the invention should work. 
61 See Rengo Co. v. Molins Mach. Co., 657 F.2d 535, 551 (3d Cir. 1981). 
62 See In re Gosteli, 872 F.2d 1008, 1012 (Fed. Cir. 1989). 
63 See Lockwood v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 107 F.3d 1565, 1572 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (noting 
that the written description requirement may be satisfied with "words, structures, figures, 
diagrams, formulas, etc."). 
64 See Vas-Cath, Inc, 935 F.2d at 1560-63. 
65 See 35 U.S.C. § 112, para. l (2000). 
66 Id. 
67 See Engel Indus., Inc. v. Lockformer Co., 946 F.2d 1528, 1533 (Fed. Cir. 1991). 
68 See id.; AK Steel Corp. v. Sollac, 344 F.3d 1234, 1241 (Fed. Cir. 2003); In re 
Wright, 999 F.2d 1557, 1561 (Fed. Cir. 1993). 
69 See In re Wright, 999 F .2d at 1561; In re Wands, 858 F .2d 731, 73 7 (Fed. Cir. 1988). 
70 See CFMT, Inc. v. Yieldup Int'! Corp., 349 F.3d 1333, 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 
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The enablement requirement creates a specification that teaches those other 
than the patentee how to actually practice the invention. In addition, the 
enablement requirement causes the specification, in most cases, to contain 
specific examples-embodiments--ofthe invention.71 
Finally, the best mode requirement mandates that the patent applicant 
include the best mode of practicin~ the patented invention contemplated by the 
inventor at the patent's filing date. 2 This rule prompts the disclosure of further 
information by the patentee about the invention. If she has a best way of 
practicing her invention, she must share that information with the public 
through the specification. 73 
All three of these information producing rules work together to create a 
patent specification that is rich with invention-specific information. The 
requirements ask the inventor to provide this information about her invention 
for the world to see. The specification must describe the invention, in 
accordance with the written description requirement, enable its use, in 
accordance with the enablement requirement, and announce the best way of 
implementing it, in accordance with the best mode requirement. These 
requirements ensure that the specification contains a textual description of the 
patentee's invention and enough technical information to enable the use of the 
patentee's invention. 
The specification also usually includes additional invention-specific 
information. The specification frequently includes a background of the 
invention.74 This background section describes the problem the patented 
invention addresses and any prior attempts to solve the same or similar 
problems. The specification also includes a summary of the invention 
indicating the invention's nature, substance, and purpose. 75 After this 
background and overview, the specification provides a detailed description of 
the invention. 76 In this detailed description, the patentee sets forth specific 
embodiments of the invention-working examples or uses of the patent 
invention. This detailed description is supplemented with drawings.77 These 
drawings can consist of detailed figures, flowcharts, or diagrammatic views of 
the invention and any described embodiments.78 An appendix can follow the 
specification, including, for example, tables of data, computer code, or 
"sequence listings" for genetic inventions.79 
71 While most patents include working examples to enable the patented invention, such 
examples are not explicitly required. See In re Borkowski, 422 F.2d 904, 908 (C.C.P.A. 
1970). 
72 See 35 U.S.C. § 112, para. 1 (2000) ("The specification ... shall set forth the best 
mode contemplated by the inventor of carrying out his invention."); Eli Lilly & Co. v. Barr 
Labs., Inc., 251 F.3d 955, 963 (Fed. Cir. 2001). 
73 See id. 
74 37 C.F.R. § 1.77(b)(5) (2003). 
75 37 C.F.R. § 1.73 (2003). 
76 37 C.F.R. § 1.77(b)(8)(2003). 
77 37 C.F.R. § 1.81 (2003). 
78 37 C.F.R. § 1.8l(a)-(b)(2003). 
79 37 C.F.R. § 1.77(b)(4)(2003). 
2005] CLAIM INTERPRETATION AND INFORMATION COSTS 71 
The information about the invention conveyed by the specification does 
not end with the specification's actual text and drawings. The specification is 
written to a particular audience-a person having ordinary skill in the art.so 
This individual brings her knowledge and skill to bear when reading the 
specification. A description of one way to implement the invention may 
disclose a multitude of variations to a skilled artisan.s 1 For example, if the 
specification literally describes how to design a widget with wood, that 
specification may actually teach a skilled artisan how to implement the 
invention in other materials in addition to wood, such as synthetic laminates or 
even steel. The extent of the specification's teachings about the invention are 
limited by its contents combined with the knowledge and skill of a person with 
ordinary skill in the relevant art. s2 
Finally, all of this information in the specification is provided under a 
"duty of candor and good faith dealing with the [USPTO]."s3 Rules of 
procedure before the USPTO require the inventor and others associated with 
the patent application, such as the patent attorney, to be truthful in their 
dealings with the USPTO.s4 If the patentee makes a material misrepresentation 
or omission of a material fact with the intent to deceive, then she has engaged 
in inequitable conduct before the USPTO and her patent is unenforceable. ss 
Thus, the requirements to produce information regarding the invention set forth 
in § 112 are further enforced through the duty of candor requirements in place 
in the USPTO. Not only does the patentee need to provide specific information 
regarding her invention in the specification, that information must be truthful 
and not misleading. In addition, in light of new patent office rules, the applicant 
may be asked to provide other information related to the invention. s6 
Figure 1, below, depicts the specification's teachings about the invention 
as a result of patent law's information producing rules. Notably, the "literal 
specification"-what the specification exactly says and shows-is 
supplemented with the skill in the art as of the patent's filing date.s7 This 
additional knowledge expands the teachings of the specification about the 
invention, creating what can be termed the "constructive specification." This 
constructive specification embodies the full extent of the specification's 
80 See supra note 58. 
81 See In re Howarth, 654 F.2d 103, 105 (C.C.P.A. 1981) ("An inventor need not, 
however, explain every detail since he is speaking to those skilled in the art."). 
82 See In re Gay, 309 F.2d 769, 774 (C.C.P.A. 1962) (noting the appreciation by one 
skilled in the art of aspects of the specification not explicitly disclosed). 
83 37 C.F.R. § 1.56 (2003). 
84 See id. 
85 See Hoffmann-La Roche, Inc. v. Promega Corp., 323 F.3d 1354, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 
2003). A fact is material ifit is material to an issue ofpatentability. See 37 C.F.R. § 1.56(b) 
(2003). 
86 See 37 C.F.R. § 1.105 (2003). 
87 See In re Wertheim, 541F.2d257, 262 (C.C.P.A. 1976) (noting that the specification 
teachings are frozen as of the patent's filing date). 
While not visually depicted in Figure 1, the specification's literal teachings are also 
supplemented with experimentation by the skilled artisan that is not undue. See AK Steel 
Corp. v. Sollac, 344 F.3d 1234, 1244 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 
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Sp ecifi cation 
B. Claim-Related Information Producing Rules 
Skill in 
the Art 
Patent law also requires the inventor to conclude her patent with one or 
more patent claims. 88 The claim is a single sentence in which the patentee must 
"particularly point[] out and distinctly claim[] the matter which the applicant 
regards as his invention."89 The patent claim is where the inventor must tell the 
world the exact contours of the invention over which she wishes protection. 
The claim is meant to provide boundary information regarding the invention. 
Instead of informing the public generally about the invention or how to make or 
use the invention, the claim attempts to define only the invention. The specific 
definition of the protected invention is set forth in the patent's one or more 
claims. 
The requirement for a patent claim is relatively new when compared to the 
age of the specification requirements discussed above and the patent system 
itself.9° The early patent statutes of 1790 and 1793 did not explicitly require a 
88 See 35 U.S.C. § 112, para. 2 (2000); 37 C.F.R. § l.75(a) (2003). 
89 35 U.S.C. § 112, para. 2. 
90 See William Redin Woodward, Definiteness and Particularity in Patent Claims, 46 
MICH. L. REV. 755, 757 (1948); see also Karl Lutz, Evolution of the Claims of the U.S. 
Patents (Part I), 20 PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 134 (1938). 
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claim.91 Before the modem patent claim was introduced, courts defined the 
scope of patent rights by discerning the "principle" or "essence" of the 
invention from the description in the specification.9 Any understanding of the 
full scope of the patentee's protected invention was taken solely from the 
drawings and text in the patent's specification. This inquiry was often 
recognized as a point of intrinsic difficulty.93 As a result of this inquiry, juries 
would sometimes erroneously find that the patentee was trying to ~ain 
protection over things that had already been done, invalidating the patent. 4 In 
other instances, some juries would improperly find the patent limited to the 
particulars of the embodiments set forth in the patent's specification, severely 
narrowing the protected invention.95 
Under the specification-only system, both the patentee and the public were 
unable to easily and consistently define the specific invention the patent 
protected.96 The specification provided information on the invention, but failed 
to provide the information in such a way as to define the exact contours of the 
invention the patentee wished to protect. The specification contained little 
information regarding the invention's borders. The invention a patentee wished 
to protect was sometimes broader than the specific examples in the 
specification, but could not exclusively include aspects of the invention that 
had already been done or were obvious.97 The specification does not, by design, 
delineate the exact boundaries of the protected invention. The specification-
only model proved to be an inadequate way to successfully define the protected 
invention. 
The Patent Act of 1870 changed the claiming requirements, specifying that 
the patentee needed to claim her invention distinctly and with particularity.98 
The 1870 Act prompted patentees to engage in "peripheral claiming. "99 
"Peripheral claiming" involves the use of claims to "mark[] out the periphery or 
boundary of the area covered by the claim."100 The patent claim was seen as a 
means though which the patentee could recite the specific metes and bounds of 
the patented invention. 10 The emphasis shifted from the specification to the 
claim to define the scope of patent protection. 
91 See Woodward, supra note 90, at 758; see also Act of April 10, 1790, ch. 7, § 2, 1 
Stat.109, 110;Actof1793,ch. ll,§§ 1,3, 1 Stat.318,318-321. 
92 See Odiorne v. Winkley, 18 F. Cas. 581, 582 (C.C.D. Mass, 1814) (No. 10,432). 
93 See id. 
94 See John F. Duffy, The Festo Decision and the Return of the Supreme Court to the 
Bar of Patents, 2002 SUP. CT. REV. 273, 309. 
95 See id. 
96 See id. at 309-10 (discussing this difficulty in the early 1800's). 
97 See id. at 310--11. 
98 Act of July 8, 1870, ch. 230, § 26, 16 Stat. 198, 201. 
99 See RIDSDALE ELLIS, PATENT CLAIMS§§ 4-5 (1949). 
loo Id. 
101 See Robert P. Merges & Richard R. Nelson, On the Complex Economics of Patent 
Scope, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 839, 844 (1990) ("Claims define what the inventor considers to be 
the scope of her invention, the technological territory she claims is hers to control by suing 
for infringement."). 
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The patent claim, therefore, was introduced to provide a specific type of 
information about the invention-boundary information. The onus is placed on 
the inventor to tell the world exactly where her invention begins and ends. The 
claim is meant to reduce. the confusion as to the aspects of the invention over 
which the patentee is asserting protection. 102 Put another way, the claim 
identifies those aspects of the patentee's invention she wishes to protect. The 
claim's purpose is to focus the reader on what, exactly, the patent covers. 
IV. USE OF INFORMATIONAL SOURCES IN CLAIM INTERPRETATION 
While claims provide information on the boundaries of patent protection, 
claims by themselves, without any further evaluation, fail to fully convey these 
boundaries to those who need to use them to make patent decisions. As 
previously noted, the definition of the protected invention is needed to make 
most determinations regarding the patent grant. Issues of infringement and 
validity of the patented invention can be resolved only after the exact scope of 
exclusivity of the patent is determined. 103 While claims are meant to define this 
exclusivity, they must be interpreted to place them into a "meaningful context" 
for a given dispute. 104 Words standing alone cannot convey the full meaning of 
a patent claim. 105 Just as with other legal instruments, claims must be 
interpreted to be useable by an observer or court. 106 To fully appreciate the 
f . h 1 . ' . b . d 101 scope o protection, t e patent c aim s meamng must e ascertame . 
Claim interpretation, also known as claim construction, is the defining of a 
claim's terms in order to get the exact meaning of the claim. 108 Once a claim's 
meaning is determined, the exact location of the patent's metes and bounds are 
known and issues of infringement or validity can be determined. 109 Claim 
102 See, e.g., Giles S. Rich, The Extent of the Protection and Interpretation of Claims-
American Perspectives, 21 INT'L REV. INDUS. PROP. & COPYRIGHT L. 497, 499, 501 (1990) 
("[T]he function of claims is to enable everyone to know, without going through a lawsuit, 
what infringes the patent and what does not."). 
103 See Scott R. Boalick, Patent Quality and the Dedication Rule, 11 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 
215, 228 (2004). 
104 R. Polk Wagner & Lee Petherbridge, Is the Federal Circuit Succeeding? An 
Empirical Assessment of Judicial Performance, 152 U. PA. L. REV. I 105, 1117 (2004); see 
also Cass R. Sunstein, Principles, Not Fictions, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1247, 1247 (1990) ("The 
meaning of any 'text' is a function not of the bare words, but of its context and the relevant 
culture."). 
105 See, e.g., Autogiro Co. of Am. v. United States, 384 F.2d 391, 396 (Ct. Cl. 1967) 
("Claims cannot be clear and unambiguous on their face."); Kitch, supra note 4, at 268 
(noting that a claim is "an abstraction and generalization"). 
106 See Nard, supra note 29, at 2-3 (relating claim interpretation to other types oflegal 
interpretation such as contract and statutory interpretation). 
107 See Cybor Corp. v. FAS Techs., Inc., 138 F.3d 1448, 1454 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (en 
bane); Wagner & Petherbridge, supra note 104, at 1117-20. 
108 See Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 976 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en 
bane), ajf'd, 517 U.S. 370 (1996) (stating that the first step in the infringement analysis is 
"commonly known as claim construction or interpretation"). 
109 See Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 373-74 (1996) 
("Victory in an infringement suit requires a finding that the patent claim 'covers the alleged 
infringer's product or process,' which in tum necessitates a determination of 'what the words 
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interpretation is, therefore, the first step in any patent inquiry. 110 Interpreting 
claim terms is the starting point for resolving most patent issues. 111 And, in 
most instances, claim interpretation is also the stopping point. Claim 
interpretation is outcome determinative in most patent cases. 112 
Thus, while claims provide boundary information regarding the protected 
invention, this boundary information must be processed further to fully 
appreciate the scope of the invention. A claim interpretation methodology-a 
way of interpreting the patent claim-must be employed to understand the 
limits of protection. More information must be gathered and processed than just 
a reading of the patent claim. Ways of construing claims can differ, and these 
differences center around what information can be used and how it is used to 
determine a claim's meaning. 
The current methods of interpreting patent claims find their roots in the 
Supreme Court's decision in Markman v. Westview Instruments, Jnc. 113 In that 
case, the Supreme Court held that matters of claim interpretation are in the sole 
province of the court. 114 From there, the Federal Circuit, the exclusive court for 
patent appeals, 115 has interpreted claims de novo, starting anew when reviewing 
any question as to a claim's meaning. 116 This has allowed the court to focus on 
in the claim mean."') (quoting H. Schwartz, PATENT LAW AND PRACTICE 80 (2d ed. 1995)); 
McGinley v. Franklin Sports, Inc., 262 F.3d 1339, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2001); Amazon.com, Inc. 
v. Bamesandnoble.com, Inc., 239 F.3d 1343, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (noting that claim 
construction is the first step in a validity analysis). 
110 See Cybor Corp., 138 F.3d at 1454. 
111 See Wagner and Petherbridge, supra note 104, at 1119 (noting that, while still a 
matter of debate, "it is clear that claim construction plays a major-and perhaps the major-
role in patent infringement litigation"); Nard, supra note 29, at 4 (noting that claim 
interpretation "lies at the heart of our patent system"). 
112 See Markman, 52 F.3d at 993 (Mayer, J., concurring) ("Where the parties do not 
dispute any relevant facts regarding the accused product ... but disagree over possible claim 
interpretations, the question of literal infringement collapses into claim construction and is 
amenable to summary judgment."); Gen. Mills, Inc. v. Hunt-Wesson, Inc., 103 F.3d 978, 983 
(Fed. Cir. 1997). 
It is not uncommon for parties to stipulate to the outcome of issues of infringement or 
validity once a court issues its claim interpretation. See Housey Pharm., Inc. v. Astrazeneca 
UK Ltd., 366 F.3d 1348, 1349-50 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (indicating that the patentee stipulated 
that if the district court's construction "were not reversed or modified on appeal, its patents 
would be invalid and not infringed"). In fact, a court's claim construction prompts settlement 
in most patent cases. Markman Subcomm. of the Patent Litig. Comm. of the Am. Intellecutal 
Prop. Law Ass'n, The Interpretation of Patent Claims, 32 AIPLA Q. J. 1, 5 (2004) ("Given 
the great impact claim construction may have on the outcome of a case, the court's 
construction of the claims of a patent may be case dispositive or drastically affect the 
prospect of settlement."). 
113 517 U.S. 370 (1996). 
114 See id. at 372. 
115 See 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a) (2000). This exclusive appellate jurisdiction, particularly 
over cases where the only patent claim is in a counterclaim, has come into question since the 
Supreme Court's decision in Holmes Group, Inc. v. Vornado Air Circulation Systems, Inc., 
535 U.S. 826 (2002). See, e.g., Christopher A. Cotropia, "Arising Under" Jurisdiction and 
Uniformity in Patent Law, 9 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 253 (2003). 
116 See CyborCorp. v. FAS Techs., Inc., 138 F.3d 1448, 1454-55 (Fed. Cir. 1998). 
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the particulars of claim interpretation.117 Since the Markman decision, 
questions concerning claim interpretation methodologies have centered on the 
use of information in the specification and use of outside resources such as 
dictionaries to define claim terms. 118 The Federal Circuit has recently taken the 
issue of claim interpretation methodolo~~ en bane in Phillips v. A WH Corp. in 
an attempt to identify a single approach. 9 
A. Claim Language's Use in Claim Interpretation 
Any interpretation process must start with the claim language. The claim 
defines the protected invention, and in turn, frames any discussion over its own 
meaning. 120 The claim is the initial focal point for any observer attempting to 
determine the range of protection a patent gives its owner. Almost all claim 
interpretation methodologies begin with the claim's language. 
The claim language's major role in inteffretation is further established 
because it is considered "intrinsic evidence."12 Intrinsic evidence is evidence 
that is unique to the patent under construction and available to the public. 122 It 
is, in other words, intrinsic to the patent being interpreted. 123 The words of the 
claims are a classic example of intrinsic evidence-being in the patent, and, in 
fact, in the claim, being interpreted and available to the public. The claim 
language should, therefore, play a role in the claim's interpretation. 124 
However, rarely does claim language, by itself, define the invention in 
such a way as to resolve patent questions. 125 For example, in a recent Federal 
Circuit decision, E-Pass Technologies, Inc. v. 3Com Corp., the claim term in 
117 See Wagner & Petherbridge, supra note 104, at 1122-24 (concluding that the 
Supreme Court's decision in Markman mandated the Federal Circuit to develop legal rules to 
govern the process of claim interpretation). 
118 See id. at 1133-36 (noting two different approaches to claim interpretation-the 
holistic and procedural approach-that differ in their use of the specification and outside 
definitional sources); see also James R. Barney, In Search of "Ordinary Meaning," 85 J. 
PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'Y IOI, 105--06 (2003); John M. Romary & Arie M. 
Michelsohn, Patent Claim Interpretation After Markman: How the Federal Circuit 
Interprets Claims, 46 AM. U. L. REv. 1887, 1897-1926 (1997). The two approaches, to a 
lesser extent, differ in their usage of the patent's prosecution history. The use of the 
prosecution history in claim interpretation and the associated information costs are beyond 
the scope of this Article. 
119 See Phillips v. AWH Corp., 376 F.3d 1382, 1383 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (en bane) (per 
curiam) ("Phillips If'). This would, potentially, rectify the current divide among the Federal 
Circuit's opinions on the methodology to apply when interpreting patent claims. See Wagner 
& Petherbridge, supra note 104, at 1171-74. 
120 See Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1996). 
121 See id; see also Bell Communications Research, Inc. v. Vitalink Communications 
Corp., 55 F.3d 615, 620 (Fed. Cir. 1995). 
122 See Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 979 (en bane), ajf'd, 517 
U.S. 370 (1996). 
123 See Vitronics Corp., 90 F.3d at 1582. 
124 See id. (noting the general bias towards using intrinsic evidence to interpret the 
patent claim). 
125 See supra notes 104-107. 
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question was "card."126 The patent at issue described "an electronic 
multifunction card comprising a storage accommodating a plurality of 
individual data sets representing individual single-purpose cards." 127 The 
dispute focused on whether the alleged infringer's "Palm Pilot" device, a 
personal data assistant, is a "card."128 In order to resolve the dispute, the term 
"card" needed to be given a definition. Did "card" simply mean something that 
is flat, rectangular, and stiff, or, did card refer to something of the standard 
dimensions of a credit card, or other specific type of card? 129 More information 
must be gathered and processed in order to give a claim term, such as "card" in 
E-Pass Technologies, Inc. v. 3Com Corp., enough meaning to resolve the 
particular dispute at issue. 130 
B. Specification 's Use in Claim Interpretation 
The specification accompanying the claim being interpreted is also 
considered intrinsic evidence. 131 A specification . is intrinsic because, by 
statutory requirement, it must accompan~ the patent claims, and it, like the 
claim, is available for the public to view. 32 The specification is also required, 
as discussed above, to contain information about the same invention the claims 
define. 133 As such, the specification is an eligible source from which a claim's 
. b d" d 1~ meaning can e isceme . 
However, when and how the specification is used during claim 
interpretation is the focus of much debate. There are two prevailing views on 
the specification's use during the claim construction process. 135 One method of 
interpretation looks at the whole specification early in the definitional 
process. 136 The teachings regarding the invention in the specification are 
examined near the beginning of the interpretation process to gain a better 
understanding of the invention, and this understanding is used to define the 
126 343 F.3d 1364, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 
127 Id. (quoting patent in dispute's specification). 
128 See id. at 1366 (indicating that the complete claim language at issue was "electronic 
multi-function card"). 
129 See id. at 1367-1371 (examining the dispute between these two competing 
definitions and picking the former). 
130 See, e.g., id. at 1367-68 (looking at some outside definitional sources-Merriam-
Webster's Collegiate Dictionary (10th ed. 1999), Random House Webster's Unabridged 
Dictionary (2d ed. 1998), and The Oxford English Dictionary, (2d ed. 1989)-to aid in the 
court's interpretation of the disputed claim term). 
131 See Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1996); 
Autogiro Co. of Am. v. United States, 384 F.2d 391, 397-98 (Ct. Cl. 1967). 
132 See 35 U.S.C. § 112, para. I (2000). 
133 See supra notes 55-87. 
134 See Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 979 (en bane), aff d, 517 
U.S. 370 (1996). 
135 These views apply in a similar fashion to the use of the prosecution history by the 
two current methodologies. 
136 This method of interpretation has been termed the "holistic approach." See Wagner 
& Petherbridge, supra note 104, at 1133, 1135-36; Barney, supra note 118, at 105-08. 
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disputed claim tenn. 137 In contrast, another method of construction has a very 
narrow view of the specification's role in defining claim tenns. 138 The 
specification is referenced late in the interpretation process and is inspected 
only to see if there are explicit definitions or· disclaimers concerning the claim 
tenn. 139 The two contrasting methods have very different views on the 
specification's role in defining claim language. 140 
These distinct uses of the specification can be traced back to two often 
recited canons of claim interpretation. 141 One canon requires that claims be 
interpreted in light of their accompanying specification. 142 Another canon 
instructs that limitations from the specification cannot be read into the 
claims. 143 A method of interpretation that considers the specification as a 
whole, early in the process, stays true to the former canon. By considering the 
whole specification every time a claim is interpreted, the methodology ensures 
that claims are defined in light of the teachings in the specification.144 In 
contrast, a method that uses infonnation in the specification sparingly and in 
limited circumstances, focuses on the latter canon. This method shies away 
from using the specification to define the claim at all, to ensure that limitations 
from the specification are not inappropriately read into the claim's meaning. 145 
The facts in the current en bane case of Phillips v. A WH Corp. provide a 
perfect example of the different uses of the specification described above. In 
the underlying Federal Circuit's panel decision in Phillips v. AWH Corp. 
("Phillips I"), the specification played a major role in the claim's 
interpretation. 146 The patent at issue in Phillips I concerned modular wall 
137 See, e.g., Wang Labs., Inc. v. Am. Online, Inc., 197 F.3d 1377, 1381-83 (Fed. Cir. 
1999) (demonstrating this use of the specification in claim interpretation). 
138 This method of interpretation has been termed the "procedural approach." See 
Wagner & Petherbridge, supra note 104, at 1133-35; Barney, supra note 118, at 105-08. 
Others have called this method the formalistic approach. See Ruoyu Roy Wang, Note, Texas 
Digital Systems v. Telegenix, Inc.: Toward a More Formalistic Patent Claim Construction 
Model, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 153, 165 (2004). 
139 See, e.g., E-Pass Techs., Inc. v. 3Com Corp., 343 F.3d 1364, 1367-71 (Fed. Cir. 
2003); Tex. Digital Sys., Inc. v. Telegenix, Inc., 308 F.3d 1193, 1201-06 (Fed. Cir. 2002) 
(demonstrating this use of the specification in claim interpretation). 
140 See Wagner & Petherbridge, supra note I 04, at 1133. 
141 See id. 
142 See Microsoft Corp. v. Multi-Tech Sys., Inc., 357 F.3d 1340, 1347--48 (Fed. Cir. 
2004) ("[T]he claims must be interpreted in light of the specification."). 
143 See Johnson Worldwide Assocs. v. Zebco Corp., 175 F.3d 985, 989-90 (Fed. Cir. 
1999) ("[C]laim terms cannot be narrowed by reference to the written description or 
prosecution history unless the language of the claims invites reference to those sources."); 
Locite Corp. v. Ultraseal Ltd., 781 F.2d 861, 867 (Fed. Cir. 1985) ("Generally, particular 
limitations or embodiments appearing in the specification will not be read into the claims."). 
144 See Wang Labs., Inc. v. Am. Online, Inc., 197 F.3d 1377, 1381-83 (Fed. Cir. 1999). 
145 See Tex. Digital Sys., Inc. v. Telegenix, Inc., 308 F.3d 1193, 1204 (Fed. Cir. 2002) 
("Consulting the written description and prosecution history as a threshold step in the claim 
construction process, before any effort is made to discern the ordinary and customary 
meanings attributed to the words themselves, invites a violation of our precedent counseling 
against importing limitations into the claims."). 
146 See Phillips v. AHW Corp., 363 F.3d 1207, 1212-14 (Fed. Cir. 2004) ("Phillips I"), 
vacated by 376 F.3d 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (en bane). 
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panels that are resistant to fire, sound, and impact. 147 These modular panels are 
used to construct detention facilities, such as jails, as well as vaults or safety 
barriers. 148 The claim term in dispute was "baffles"-structures that reside 
inside the steel shell making up the claimed modular panel walls. 149 
The majority concluded that the term "baffles" used in the asserted claim 
included only baffles angled in relation to the steel shell at other than 90 
degrees. 150 The court focused on the specification early in the interpretation 
process. 151 In particular, the court focused on descriptions in the specification 
of the baffles "disposed at such an~les that bullets which might penetrate the 
outer steel panels are deflected."15 The majority also relied on the patent's 
drawings, depicting the baffles "disposed at angles which tend to deflect the 
bullets," to come to its conclusion. 153 As the court articulated, "[i]t is 
impossible to derive anything else from the specification."154 The court further 
noted that the patent's specification does not depict or describe the baffles at a 
90 degree angle-an angle that cannot deflect projectiles directed at the 
building module. 155 
The dissent applied a different claim interpretation methodology, one 
limiting the specification's use during interpretation. The dissent was very 
careful to not let the specification influence its definition of the claim term 
"baffles." It examined the specification through a heavily filtered lens, looking 
only to see if "the patentee, acting as his own lexicographer, gave a special 
meaning to the term baffles," or if the Fatentee affirmatively disclaimed any 
portion of the term's ordinary meaning. 15 The dissent found nothing to indicate 
that the patentee affirmatively redefined the term "baffles" to be limited to 
baffles oriented at angles other than 90 degrees. 157 In addition, the dissent 
found no disclaimer as to any part of the ordinary meaning in the 
specification. 158 Instead, as will be discussed in detail below, the dissent 
147 See id. at 1209 (citing the patent at issue). 
148 See id. 
149 See id. at 1210-11. 
150 See id. at 1214 (using the holistic approach to claim interpretation). 
151 See id. 
152 See id. (quoting the patent's specification). 
153 See id. (pointing in particular to Figures 6 and 12 of the patent, which are described 
as showing the angular nature of the baffles that deflects bullets that penetrate the steel shell 
of the invented building panels). 
154 See id. at 1213-14 (majority noting that the patentee stated, at the end of the 
specification that the "'invention has advanced the art by providing modular buildings and 
modules of high strength [and] bullet resistance,' adding that ' [ u ]niquely the advantages of 
steel shell modules are combined with thermal and acoustical isolation of two spaced walls 
and protection against bullet penetration of the walls"' (quoting the patent and adding 
emphasis)). 
155 See id. at 1213-14. 
156 Id. at 1217 (Dyk, J., dissenting in part) (using the procedural approach to claim 
interpretation). 
151 Id. 
158 Id. at 1218-19. 
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focused on a dictionary definition of the term "baffles," and adopted it as the 
claim term's meaning. 159 
The two approaches to claim interpretation demonstrated by the majority's 
and dissent's opinions in Phillips I are the two prevailing methods of using the 
specification during claim interpretation. 160 The first approach primarily looks 
to the specification to gain its understanding of the invention and, in tum, 
define the claim term in dispute. The second approach rarely uses the 
specification to define claim terms, using information in the specification in 
limited instances where the patentee either explicitly defines a claim term or 
affirmatively disclaims particular subject matter. The very different views of 
the specification's role during the claim interpretation process are accompanied 
by very different views on the use of external sources to interpret claim 
terms-particularly, the use of dictionaries and other definitional sources. 
C. Dictionary's Use in Claim Interpretation 
Sources falling outside the patent's public record are considered "extrinsic 
evidence."161 Extrinsic evidence includes, for example, expert testimony, 
inventor testimony, scientific articles, technical treatises, and dictionaries. 162 
These sources may be relevant to the patent's field of technol~y. 163 They are 
not, however, specific to the patent, and, thus, are not intrinsic. 1 
The focus on the use of extrinsic sources such as dictionaries in claim 
interpretation has increased as of late. 165 Just as there are different perspectives 
on the use of the specification in claim interpretation, there is also a current 
division on the use of dictionaries, and related definitional sources, in claim 
interpretation. 166 Methodologies that use the specification extensively to 
interpret claims do not often tum to dictionaries to define claim terms. 167 
Dictionaries may be referenced, but the specification is the first place examined 
to discern a claim term's meaning. 168 In contrast, those methodologies that 
rarely use the specification demonstrate an increased reliance on dictionaries to 
159 Id. 
160 See Wagner & Petherbridge, supra note 104, at 1133-36; 1172-73 (noting that the 
procedural approach, the methodology used by the dissent in Phillips I, is currently the more 
prevalently used approach by the Federal Circuit). 
161 See Pall Corp. v. Micron Separations, Inc., 66 F.3d 1211, 1216 (Fed. Cir. 1995). 
162 See Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1583 (Fed. Cir. 1996). 
163 See id. 
164 See id. 
165 While the proceeding discussion focuses on the use of dictionaries, other extrinsic 
sources such as expert testimony can be used during claim interpretation. See id. However, 
their use is limited by the canon of interpretation that restricts the reference to extrinsic 
evidence to instances where the claims are still ambiguous after referring to all of the 
intrinsic evidence. See id. 
166 The term "dictionary" will be used in this Article to refer to all external definitional 
sources, including such sources as treatises. 
167 See Wagner & Petherbridge, supra note 104, at 1133, 1135-36. 
168 See, e.g., Microsoft Corp. v. Multi-Tech Sys., Inc., 357 F.3d 1340, 1347--49 (Fed. 
Cir. 2004) (focusing on the teachings of the specification, not a dictionary definition, to 
construe the claim language). 
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obtain claim meaning. 169 In fact, such methodologies employ a "heavy 
presumption" in favor of a claim's ordinary meaning, and they determine this 
ordinary meaning from a dictionary or other external definitional source. 170 A 
dictionary is referenced first, before the specification is even considered, to 
d . h d" . 171 etermme t e or mary meanmg. 
The Phillips I case can again be used to demonstrate the different 
approaches' use of dictionaries in claim interpretation. The majority mentioned 
the dictionary definition of the claim term in dispute: "baffles."172 However, the 
majority then immediately turned its focus to the specification and the 
teachings contained therein about the invention. 173 The dictionary definition 
was not the focal point of the majority's claim interpretation analysis, nor did 
the majority mention a "heavy presumption" in favor of one type of evidence 
over another. The majority based its ultimate interpretation of the term 
"baffles" on the specification's teachings. 174 
In contrast, the first step the dissent took in interpreting "baffles" was to 
identify the term's ordinary meaning. 175 The dissent turned to a dictionary to 
ascertain this meaning, using the 2002 edition of Webster's Third New 
International Dictionary. 176 The dissent would only stray from this dictionary 
definition if there is enough "evidence" to overcome the heavy presumption in 
favor of it. 177 The dissent found no evidence, such as an explicit definition or 
affirmative disclaimer, to overcome the presumption.17 As the dissent 
articulated its methodology, 
Since there is no argument here that one of skill in the art would ascribe a 
specialized meaning to the term baffles, and there has been no disclaimer 
in the specification or prosecution history, the general purpose dictionary 
definition, 'something for deflecting, checking, or otherwise regulating 
flow,' Webster's at 162, applies. 179 
169 See Wagner & Petherbridge, supra note 104, at 1133-35; Wang, supra note 138, at 
163-65. 
170 See Tex. Digital Sys., Inc. v. Telegenix, Inc., 308 F.3d 1193, 1201-05 (Fed. Cir. 
2002); Johnson Worldwide Assocs. v. Zebco Corp., 175 F.3d 985, 989-90 (Fed. Cir. 1999) 
(establishing the "heavy presumption in favor of the ordinary meaning of claim language"); 
Barney, supra note 118, at 108-09 (noting that the "heavy presumption" in favor of a claim 
term's ordinary meaning establishes an evidentiary burden of sorts that must be overcome to 
allow information from the specification, or other intrinsic sources such as the prosecution 
history, to influence the claim interpretation). 
171 See Tex. Digital Sys., Inc., 308 F.3d at 1204-05. 
172 See Phillips v. AHW Corp., 363 F.3d 1207, 1212 (Fed. Cir. 2004) ("Phillips I"), 
vacated by 376 F.3d 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (en bane). 
173 See id. at 1212-14. 
174 See id. at 1213-14. 
175 See id. at 1216-17 (Dyk, J., dissenting in part). 
176 See id. at 1216-18. 
177 See id. at 1217 (finding no support for adding additional structural limitations to the 
ordinary meaning of "baffles"). 
178 See id. at 121 7-18. 
179 Id. at 1218 (citations omitted). 
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The questions in the en bane order in Phillips II capture the current 
differences in varying claim interpretation methodologies, particularly, their 
differing views on uses of information sources. In particular, the questions 
focus on the use of two interpretative tools-the specification and 
dictionaries. 180 The first en bane question asks whether "referencing primarily 
to technical and general purpose dictionaries and similar sources to interpret a 
claim term or by looking primarily to the patentee's use of the term in the 
specification" better serves the "public notice function of patent claims." 181 
Questions two and three of the en bane order further focus on how the 
specification and dictionaries are used in claim interpretation. 182 As the 
questions in the en bane order of Phillips II exemplify, the current debate 
regarding claim interpretation methodology concerns the proper use of the 
specification and dictionaries when trying to define claim terms. 
V. MINIMIZING INFORMATION COSTS DURING CLAIM 
INTERPRETATION 
As evidenced above, there are differing claim interpretation methodologies 
currently being implemented by the Federal Circuit. 183 This divergence in 
approach has progressed from the Supreme Court's decision in Markman. The 
Markman case allowed the Federal Circuit to focus on the development of 
claim interpretation methodology by putting interpretation in the province of 
the court. From there, approaches to interpretation have evolved into two 
distinct schools of interpretation. The en bane order in Phillips II identifies the 
major difference between the two approaches-their use of the specification 
and external definitional sources-and asks, essentially: Which is the proper 
method? 184 The order, therefore, ripens the question as to which approach is 
superior. 
As discussed previously, inventions are intangible, and this intangibility 
presents significant information costs in the acquisition and processing of 
invention-related information. 185 Patent law must, however, define the 
invention in order to provide an incentive to invent and effectively enforce the 
inventor's exclusivity over the invention. 186 Patent law initially responds to 
these high information costs by implementing certain information producing 
rules that require the inventor to both provide information describing and 
enabling her invention and set forth with particularity the boundaries of her 
180 The questions include prosecution history estoppel alongside the specification. See 




183 See Wagner & Petherbridge, supra note 104, at 1171-74 (noting, empirically, the 
presence of two different schools of claim interpretation, but with a trend towards the 
procedural approach). 
184 Phillips II, 376 F.3d at 1383. 
185 See supra Part II.B-C. 
186 See supra Part II.A. 
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invention. 187 Both of these types of information are contained in the publicly 
available patent document itself. However, a new set of information costs is 
introduced-the information costs that must be expended to interpret the patent 
claim. 
The way claims are construed can be evaluated based on the information 
costs a particular construction approach requires to be expended. An approach 
that makes it easier for someone to obtain information about the invention's 
boundaries and process this information to determine the scope of protection is 
advantageous over those approaches that do not. 188 This is particularly true 
when dealing with inventions that already have inherently high information 
costs associated with their definition. Courts should pick a claim interpretation 
methodology that minimizes net information costs. 
A. Full and Early Use of the Specification Minimizes Information Costs 
By taking full advantage of the invention-specific information the 
specification has to offer, methodologies such as those employed by the 
majority in Phillips I minimize information costs. Such methodologies 
minimize information costs because of the type of information contained in the 
specification. The s~ecification is required to provide information about the 
claimed invention. 1 9 This information is tailored to the invention at issue, 
thereby providing contextual information for use during claim interpretation. 
By providing invention-specific, and more particularly, claim-specific 
information, the specification can help lower the costs associated with 
understanding the invention defined in the claims. 190 
In addition, the particular type of information in the specification helps 
overcome the intangibleness of the invention. Patent rules, such as the written 
description and the enablement requirements, force the inventor to provide the 
public with specific information about her invention. 191 The patent must 
describe the extent of the inventor's invention, and it must instruct those skilled 
in the art on how to make and use the invention. These rules produce a 
specification that includes, in addition to a general textual description of the 
invention, drawings depicting different aspects of the invention and 
descriptions of specific embodiments of the invention-real world 
187 See supra Part IIl.A-B. 
188 See, e.g., Long, supra note 19, at 539-46 (evaluating patent doctrines such as the 
subject matter requirement under an information costs paradigm). 
189 See Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Gen-Probe, Inc., 323 F.3d 956, 968 (Fed. Cir. 2002) 
(noting that the specification must "describe the claimed invention so that one skilled in the 
art can recognize what is claimed"); In re Hyatt, 708 F.2d 712, 714 (Fed. Cir. 1983) ("[T]he 
enabling disclosure of the specification [must] be commensurate in scope with the claim 
under consideration."). 
190 See Long, supra note 19, 504-05 (noting how "the patent specification-the 
document that describes the invention in detail-helps reduce" the burden on observers in 
"determining the boundaries of protected property"); F. Scott Kieff, The Case for 
Registering Patents and the Law and Economics of Present Patent-Obtaining Rules, 45 B.C. 
L. Rev. 55, 99 (2003) (noting that "the § 112 disclosure requirements decrease social costs 
by serving to give clear notice about the property right"). 
191 See supra Part Ill.A-B. 
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implementations of the invention. Such information places the invention in a 
real world context, describing how the invention is actually fabricated and used 
in physical space. 192 This type of information adds a tangibleness to the 
invention-the invention can be considered more like a thing. This additional 
information allows an interpreter to take advantage of the inventor's reduction 
of the inventive concept to tangible embodiments and examples in the 
specification. 193 The cognitive burden placed on an observer when trying to 
understand the invention is accordingly lowered. 194 An interpreter can, 
therefore, rely upon her familiarity with physical things to better understand the 
patented invention. 195 
Furthermore, the information in the specification is easy to find. The cost 
expended in obtaining the information is almost nil, considering the 
specification is publicly available and resides in the same document as the 
claim under interpretation. The specification also stays static after the patent is 
filed, 196 meaning it is a fixed source of information, further lowering 
information collecting costs. 197 
The information in the specification is produced by the inventor, the 
lowest cost source for invention-specific information. 198 The inventor provides 
this information at the beginning of the patent process, when she applies for a 
patent. 199 Information about the invention and how it is made and used is just as 
available to the patent examiner during prosecution as it is to a judge 
interpreting the claims in litigation. The information is also self-authenticating, 
considering the patentee is under a duty of candor and good faith when the 
information is produced.200 The costs for others to obtain similar information 
would be tremendous.201 Patent law places the information producing burdens 
192 See Long, supra note 19, at 486 ("Seeing the tangible embodiment of a cotton gin, 
or a picture of the tangible embodiment of the cotton gin, is a low-cost way of cognizing the 
concept of the gin-as-a-thing."). Inventions are, in most cases, easier to convey in drawings 
rather than words. See Autogiro Co. of Am. v. United States, 384 F.2d 391, 397 (Ct. Cl. 
1967) ("An invention exists most importantly as a tangible structure or a series of drawings. 
A verbal portrayal is usually an afterthought written to satisfy the requirements of patent 
law."). 
193 See Long, supra note 19, at 486-88 (noting how reductionism lowers the 
information costs associated with comprehending something). 
194 See id. 
195 See id. at 482-85 (noting how familiarity with physical things reduces information 
costs). 
196 See 35 U.S.C. § 132 (2000) (prohibiting the addition of new matter into the 
disclosure of the invention after filing). New information can be added to the specification 
after filing, but this information must be supported by the information already in the 
specification. See id. 
197 There are, however, potential increased costs to the patent applicant to maximize her 
specification in response to the claim interpretation methodology used by the courts. 
198 See Long, supra note 19, at 496-98 (discussing allocating informational burdens). 
199 See 37 C.F.R. § 1.163 (2003). 
200 See supra notes 83-85. 
201 A potential infringer or a competitor may also have information about the invention, 
or at least information related to the invention, because of their own activities-building or 
using a product related to the invention. These individuals certainly would not need to 
expend as much in the way of information costs to understand the invention as a completely 
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on the individual that will incur the lowest costs in obtaining and providing that 
information. 202 Using the specification fully and early in the process takes 
advantage of already produced information by the lowest cost producer-the 
patentee. 
One could argue that the information the specification provides increases 
information costs by overwhelming the interpreter with too much information. 
A plethora of information-information overload-can increase information 
costs.203 Time and energy are expended to gather all of the information, filter 
out irrelevant information, and comprehend the remaining information. Such a 
concern with the patent's specification is not unfounded, with there being no 
page limits or content limitation on the specification. As long as the patent 
provides the required information, no statute forbids extraneous information. 204 
However, the claims help focus the interpreter on the relevant information 
in the specification.205 As demonstrated in Phillips I, the majority looked 
through the specification with a focus on the claim term at issue, "baffles," and 
its place in the invention.206 Without the claims, overload and lack of direction 
would be a real issue. But the reason claims were introduced in the 1800's was 
to provide direction and a framework in which the invention could be 
defined.207 In addition, the inventor bears information costs of her own in 
producing such a long and burdensome specification and, therefore, has an 
incentive to not create a lengthy manifesto. Finally, the USPTO, and 
particularly the patent examiner, has the discretion to request the patentee 
streamline the patent's specification.208 Most likely, in those egregious 
instances, the USPTO will exercise this authority. 
Another potential information cost associated with using the complete 
specification early in the interpretation process is that it may mislead the 
interpreter with information having too much specificity. The particular 
embodiments in the specification may be mistaken as describing the full scope 
of the invention.209 That is, the specifics of the examples in the specification 
uninformed observer. However, the knowledge of potential infringers and competitors is still 
peripheral to the core knowledge of the inventor-the originator of the concept being 
protected by the patent. The information costs differential may be smaller, but the inventor is 
still the lowest cost provider of invention-specific information. 
202 See Long, supra note 19, at 496-98. 
203 See, e.g., Daniel J. Solove, The Virtues of Knowing Less: JustifYing Privacy 
Protections Against Disclosure, 53 DUKE L.J. 967, 1035-44 (2003) (indicating that more 
information can lead to mistakes and misjudgments). 
204 But see 37 C.F.R. § l.56(a)-(b) (2003) (placing on the applicant a duty to not 
intentionally mislead the USPTO on an issue ofpatentability). 
205 See supra Part III.B. 
206 See Phillips v. AHW Corp., 363 F.3d 1207, 1212-14 (Fed. Cir. 2004) ("Phillips I"), 
vacated by 376 F.3d 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (en bane). 
207 See supra Part IIl.B. 
208 See U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, MANUAL OF 
PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE § 608.01 (8th ed., rev. 2 May 2004) (noting that the 
specification must be clear and concise). 
209 See Tex. Digital Sys., Inc. v. Telegenix, Inc., 308 F.3d 1193, 1204--05 (Fed. Cir. 
2002) ("Consulting the written description and prosecution history as a threshold step in the 
claim construction process, before any effort is made to discern the ordinary and customary 
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will trump the boundaries set forth in the patent's claims, and the construer will 
interpret the claims to be limited to these examples in the specification. The 
fear of this very thing happening drives the methodology employed by the 
dissent in Phillips I. In fact, the dissent accused the majority of doing just 
that-improperly limiting the claims to the particular embodiment in the 
"fi . 210 spec1 1cat1on. 
This fear is well-founded. But a proper understanding of the information 
the specification provides should quell such fears and ensure an interpreter is 
not misled.211 As demonstrated in Figure 1 above, the specification provides 
more information about the invention than just what is literally present in the 
text and drawings.212 The invention-specific information in the specification is 
filled out with the knowledge and skill of a person having ordinary skill in the 
relevant art. An understanding of this gloss, applied to the specification's 
specific teachings, should prevent an unwarranted reading of the specification 
that improperly limits the claims to the embodiment. In addition, interpreting 
the information in the specification properly is common for actors in the patent 
system. Such information already needs to be digested and compared to the 
patent claims to determine whether the requirements of § 112 are met. Claim 
interpretation that uses the teachings of the specification takes full advantage of 
this existing knowledge and practice and, accordingly, lowers information 
costs. The majority in Phillips I, while focused on the specific embodiments, 
also discussed the extent of the teachings of the specification and concluded 
that the specification simply does not teach an invention including 90 degree 
baffles.21 Such rhetoric demonstrates a proper understanding of what is taken 
away from the specification; more than the specific embodiments, it is the 
particular information supplemented with the ordinary skill in the art. 
meanings attributed to the words themselves, invites a violation of our precedent counseling 
against importing limitations into the claims."); Dave A. Ghatt & Timothy B. Kang, Claim 
Interpretation: A Regression to Uncertain Times, 84 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'y 456, 
466-68 (2002) (fearing that resort to the specification will lead to a "slippery slope" of 
"impos[ing] additional limitations uncalled for by the claims"); Russell B. Hill & Frank P. 
Cote, Ending the Federal Circuit Crapshoot: Emphasizing Plain Meaning in Patent Claim 
Interpretation, 42 IDEA l, 22-24 (2002). 
2
'° See Phillips I, 363 F.3d at 1217 (Dyk, J., dissenting in part). 
211 See Wagner & Petherbridge, supra note 104, at 1176 (noting a strong statistical 
relationship between the holistic approach and inconsistent application of the approach, 
"thereby implying that the holistic approach is inherently more difficult for judges to apply 
in a consistent and predictable manner"); Phillips v. AWH Corp., 376 F.3d 1382, 1382 (Fed. 
Cir. 2004) (en bane) (per curiam) ("Phillips If'). The Phillips II en bane decision may 
decrease this inconsistency, if it better defines how to use the complete specification early in 
the construction process. 
212 See supra Part III.A. 
213 See Phillips I, 363 F.3d at 1214 ("Inspection of the patent shows that baffles angled 
at other than 90° is the only embodiment disclosed in the patent; it is the invention. It is 
impossible to derive anything else from the specification."). 
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B. A Heavy Presumption in Favor of Dictionary Definitions Introduces 
Information Costs 
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In contrast, employing a heavy presumption in favor of a definition taken 
from a dictionary (hereafter "dictionary methodology"), a source external to the 
patent document, introduces information costs. The dictionary methodology 
employed by the dissent in Phillips I used such a heavy presumption, and, by 
doing so, forwent the information cost savings of using the specification fully 
and early when interpreting claims. In addition, the use of dictionaries 
introduces information costs of its own.214 
The heavy presumption distances the claim interpretation process from the 
specification. As exemplified in the dissent's analysis in Phillips I, the 
specification is viewed later in the interpretation process, and it is viewed 
through a heavy filter.215 Only explicit definitions of the claim term or 
affirmative disclaimers of the term's dictionary definition are considered in 
interpreting the claim.216 By using the specification in such a limited way, the 
methodology squanders information about the invention that the patent laws 
require the inventor to produce. And this information, as discussed above, gives 
context and tangibleness to the claim, making it easier to interpret.217 
The specification's lack of influence in claim interpretation also confuses 
observers who see invention-specific information but are instructed not to fully 
use it when determining what is protected. An interpreter is naturally drawn to 
this invention-rich source, and, by telling them not to fully use it, information 
costs are introduced. Effort must be expended to discount the specification's 
information and prevent it from influencing the resulting interpretation.218 In a 
sense, it takes energy to not use something that is so native to the subject under 
interpretation-the invention. Furthermore, the specification's information is 
already evaluated by most observers to ensure that the § 112 disclosure 
214 The proceeding analysis, while focusing on dictionaries, also applies in part to the 
use of other extrinsic evidence, such as expert testimony, during claim interpretation. The 
information costs associated with the use of such outside evidence are potentially as high as 
those associated with the use of dictionaries. There are similar search costs associated with 
finding such external sources that will be relevant to the invention under interpretation. 
However, in contrast with dictionaries, it may be easier to contextualize the expert testimony 
because it can be tailored to the claim at issue-the testimony is produced for the given 
dispute. Furthermore, as long as the canon of interpretation favoring intrinsic over extrinsic 
evidence is followed, the specification, part of the intrinsic record, will be referenced first 
and cost savings will still be enjoyed. 
215 See Phillips I, 363 F.3d at 1216-18 (Dyk, J., dissenting in part). 
216 See Kumar v. Ovonic Battery Co., 351 F.3d 1364, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2003); Teleflex, 
Inc. v. Ficosa N. Am. Corp., 299 F.3d 1313, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2002) ("The patentee may 
demonstrate an intent to deviate from the ordinary and accustomed meaning of a claim term 
by including in the specification expressions of manifest exclusion or restriction, 
representing a clear disavowal of claim scope."); Wagner & Petherbridge, supra note 104, at 
1133-34 (noting that any "alteration from the ordinary meaning must be accompanied by 
significant proof that such an alteration is required under the circumstances"). 
217 See supra Part V.A. 
218 See Tex. Digital Sys., Inc. v. Telegenix, Inc., 308 F.3d 1193, 1204-05 (Fed. Cir. 
2002) (noting that it is natural when the specification is referenced to use that information to 
interpret the patent's claims). 
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requirements are met for purposes of validity. It is tough for observers to 
divorce themselves from the specification.219 
The use of dictionaries to interpret claims introduces its own set of 
information costs. First, costs must be expended to find and collect the relevant 
dictionaries.220 These costs are expended by both the inventor and observers-
those who inherently know less about the invention. Instead of using a source 
already produced by the lowest cost producer-the specification by the 
inventor-the use of dictionaries forces parties that know little initially about 
the invention to collect information, and therefore to incur additional costs.221 
Furthermore, the universe of dictionaries and other definitional sources is 
virtually unbounded.222 As noted in Miller and Hilsenteger's recent study, the 
Federal Circuit has used about seventy different external definitional sources in 
their opinions on claim construction from April 5, 1995 to June 30, 2004.223 
The number of dictionaries the parties to these cases, and all other actors in the 
patent system, have referenced during this time period is likely much greater. 
And each potential definitional source must be found, read, and considered as 
219 Notably, this argument somewhat supports the fear addressed in Part IV.A, supra-
that using the specification fully and early in interpretation will cause the claims to be 
improperly limited to the specific embodiments in the specification. This fear exists, in part, 
because of the lure the specification has in telling observers what the invention is. However, 
not completely using the specification, as is done under the heavy presumption approach, 
truly confuses the observer, while fully using it just requires the observer to understand what 
the complete teachings of the specification really include. 
220 See, e.g., ACTV, Inc. v. Walt Disney Co., 346 F.3d 1082, 1088-89 (Fed. Cir. 2003) 
(noting that dictionaries available at the time of the patent and those that likely contain the 
ordinary meaning of the claim term attributed to it by those of ordinary skill in the art should 
be used). The Federal Circuit, apparently, may not follow its own instruction, considering 
that the court usually uses general purpose English language dictionaries, such as Webster's 
Third New International Dictionary. See Joseph Scott Miller & James A. Hilsenteger, The 
Proven Key: Roles & Rules for Dictionaries at the Patent Office & the Courts, 54 AM. U.L. 
REv. (forthcoming May 2005) (manuscript at 25-26, on file with author, available at 
http://ssm.com/abstract=577262) (noting that "out of the 268 sources used, the court used 
189 (70.5%) general purpose English language sources and 79 (29.5%) specialized 
sources"); see also Phillips I, 363 F.3d at 1217-18 (Dyk, J., dissenting in part) (using a 
general purpose English dictionary); E-Pass Techs., Inc. v. 3Com Corp., 343 F.3d 1364, 
1367-68 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (same). 
221 See Miller & Hilsenteger, ~upra note 220 (manuscript at 30-43) (noting the many 
uncertainties introduced under the current use of dictionaries by the Federal Circuit); 
Jennifer R. Johnson, Out of Context: Texas Digital, the Indefiniteness of Language, and the 
Search for Ordinary Meaning, 44 IDEA 521, 526-27 (2004) (critiquing the heavy reliance 
on dictionaries in claim interpretation); Ben Hattenbach, Chickens, Eggs and Other 
Impediments to Escalating Reliance on Dictionaries in Patent Claim Construction, 85 J. 
PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'Y, 181, 189-90 (2003) (asserting that the use of dictionaries 
makes the claim interpretation process unpredictable). Miller & Hilsenteger have a potential 
solution to the dictionary identification problem-requiring patentees to identify the relevant 
dictionaries for claim interpretation during prosecution. See Miller & Hilsenteger, supra note 
220 (manuscript at 53-54). 
222 See, e.g., Miller & Hilsenteger, supra note 220 (manuscript at 25-27). 
223 Id. (manuscript at 27) (noting the use of twenty-six general purpose English sources 
and forty-four specialized sources by the Federal Circuit from April 5, 1995 to June 30, 
2004). 
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to whether it is relevant for the area of technology at issue.224 The cost of 
merely collecting information under the dictionary methodology is high. 
The costs incurred do not stop at obtaining a proper dictionary, or 
dictionaries. The dictionary definitions must then be processed and 
comprehended in the context of the patent claim. Dictionaries rarely have one 
definition for a particular term-forcing a choice between available 
definitions. 225 Questions also arise over competing definitions of the same term 
in different dictionaries.226 Terms in a dictionary definition may also need to be 
defined, requiring the expenditure of additional information costs to obtain 
another definitional source and process the definitions that source provides.227 
Finally, when a definition is decided upon, that definition, set forth in the 
abstract in the dictionary, must be placed into the context of the patent claim, 
and, ultimately, the invention at issue; placing it in context is difficult to do.228 
A dictionary definition, unlike the specification, provides little tangibleness, 
and less contextual tangibleness, to aid in the definition of the invention. A 
definition is abstract and intangible itself. Thus, a dictionary does not have the 
same potential as the specification to reduce the interpreter's cognitive burden 
in grasping the contours of the protected invention. In fact, the definition's 
abstraction may simply add to the comprehension costs already introduced by 
the lack of "thingness" of the invention and the inadequacy of claim language 
alone to articulate the invention. 
Arguments can be made that using the dictionary methodology will reduce 
information costs. The reduction most often referenced is the lowering of cost 
due to the clear, easy to follow rules the dictionary methodology introduces.229 
The process of interpretation under such a presumption is very formal, with a 
very clear procedure of interpretation. Courts and other actors in the patent 
224 See Home Diagnostics, Inc. v. Lifescan, Inc., 381 F.3d 1352, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2004) 
("The touchstone for discerning the usage of claim language is the understanding of those 
terms among artisans of ordinary skill in the relevant art at the time of invention."). 
225 See, e.g., Tex. Digital Sys., Inc. v. Telegenix, Inc., 308 F.3d 1193, 1203 (Fed. Cir. 
1999) (noting that "words often have multiple dictionary definitions, some having no 
relation to the claimed invention"); see also Phillips v. AHW Corp., 376 F.3d 1382, 1383 
(Fed. Cir. 2004) (en bane) (per curiam) ("Phillips IF') (asking in Question 2 "[h]ow does the 
concept of ordinary meaning apply if there are multiple dictionary definitions of the same 
term?" and "[i]fthe dictionary provides multiple potentially applicable definitions for a term, 
is it appropriate to look to the specification to determine what definition or definitions 
apply?"). 
226 See, e.g., Nystrom v. Trex Co., 374 F.3d 1105, 1110-12 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (facing 
different definitions of the term "board" in different dictionaries). 
227 See, e.g., Novartis Phann. Corp. v. Eon Labs Mfg., Inc., 363 F.3d 1306, 1308-10 
(Fed. Cir. 2004) (using a dictionary to define the claim term "hydrosol," then using another 
dictionary to define the term "sol" appearing in the definition of "hydrosol," and then 
defining the term "solution" appearing in the definition of "sol"). 
228 See Sunstein, supra note 104, at 1247 ("Because of the context, words sometimes 
have a meaning quite different from what might be found in Webster's or the Oxford English 
Dictionary."). 
229 See Wagner & Petherbridge, supra note I 04, at 1176; Wang, supra note 138, at 
169-73; see also Pierre J. Schlag, Rules and Standards, 33 UCLA L. Rev. 379, 386--88 
(1985) (noting some of the advantages of using legal rules). 
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system can easily follow such methodologies and results can potentially be 
replicated. 
The problem with this line of analysis is that the heavy presumption, and 
more importantly the use of external definitional sources, is not as streamlined 
and decision-free as it initially appears. As previously discussed, such a 
methodology requires the court and other actors to choose a dictionary, or 
multiple dictionaries. From these dictionaries, a single definition must be 
adopted, with the potential need to resolve dueling dictionary definitions. The 
adopted definition may also need to be defined, requiring the dictionary 
definition acquisition process to start over again. Finally, even when a 
definition is decided upon, it must be placed and understood in the context of 
the patent claim. And still, the specification is referenced, albeit in a minimal 
fashion, to see if the patentee affirmatively deviated from the dictionary 
definition. Any costs saved by using such a "clear" rule with the heavy 
presumption are likely squandered during the implementation of the 
presumption. There are many decisions that must be made during the 
interpretation process under this methodology--decisions that are by no means 
clear cut. 23° Furthermore, even if the process is cost-saving, such process-
oriented savings will not reach the level of savings gained by fully using the 
specification early in the interpretation process.231 
C. Using an Information Cost Analysis to Evaluate Claim Interpretation 
While the above discussion performs an information cost analysis on the 
current dominant schools of interpreting patent claims, an information costs 
analysis is appropriate for any method of defining a patentee's right to exclude. 
The above analysis concludes that foll, early use of the specification during 
claim interpretation lowers the information costs presented by claim 
interpretation. In contrast, employing a heavy presumption in favor of the use 
of dictionaries introduces information costs into the process. While the above 
focused on specifics, this should not take away from the more general theme of 
this Article, that an information cost analysis is an appropriate metric for 
judging claim interpretation methodologies. The definition of an invention 
presents unique information cost problems. The lower the information costs 
encountered in defining the scope of the invention, the easier it is for all 
observers to understand the critical aspect of a patent-the scope of its 
exclusivity. Claim interpretation is, at its base, an information costs problem 
and should be judged as such. 
Furthermore, the analysis above does not mean that any of the current 
methodologies completely eliminate the information costs encountered in 
understanding the extent of the invention. Interpretation still takes effort, and 
the savings introduced by full and early use of the specification may not be 
tremendous. This methodology does, however, introduce savings to a process 
and a subject-the invention-that is rife with information costs. In addition, 
230 See Miller & Hilsenteger, supra note 220 (manuscript at 30---43); Johnson, supra 
note 221, at 526-27; Hattenbach, supra note 221, at 189-90. 
231 See supra Part V.A (detailing the information cost savings under this approach). 
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defining the patent claim is extremely fundamental to the patent system. 
Information cost savings presented by a particular claim interpretation 
methodology, no matter how small in absolute terms, are quite significant in 
relative terms when judged in context. At the very least, courts do not want to 
use an interpretation methodology that introduces any additional costs to what 
is already a very costly system. 
Finally, it should be noted that there are potentially other ways claims can 
be interpreted. Furthermore, alternatives to the current peripheral claiming, 
such as central claiming,232 are available to establish the extent of the 
inventor's right to exclude. These alternative methodologies or claiming 
theories may reduce information costs even more than the two current ways of 
claim interpretation analyzed above. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Information costs are a factor that should be considered when looking at 
how claims are interpreted. Any observer of a patent already faces high 
information costs in understanding the patented invention because of its 
intangibleness. Patent rules initially respond by forcing the production of 
invention-specific information by the inventor in the patent document. 
Observers must, however, further process information about the invention to 
understand the borders of patent protection. Faced with a situation already 
having high information costs to all parties involved, the claim interpretation 
process should minimize any additional information costs. Lower information 
costs make it easier for any actor in the patent system to comprehend the most 
crucial aspect of a patent-its area of exclusivity. Those interpretation 
methodologies that fully use the specification's teachings regarding the 
invention early in the interpretation process keep costs down. The information 
in the specification is already tailored to and in context with the claim under 
interpretation. In addition, the specification provides invention-specific 
information in a low-cost fashion and includes information that caters to an 
interpreter's familiarity and ease with understanding "things." Any new 
interpretation methodology should consider the information costs it imposes on 
both the patentee and any patent observer, keeping in mind the invention-
specific information patent law already requires to be produced. 
232 Peripheral claiming is the current claiming regime codified in 35 U.S.C. § 112, para. 
2 (2000), in which patent claims define the boundaries of the patented invention. Central 
claiming is the use of a patent claim to define the center, or core, of the patented invention. 
Ellis explains: 
"There are two general methods of defining an invention---central definition and 
peripheral definition. Central definition involves the drafting of a narrow claim 
setting forth a typical embodiment coupled with broad interpretation by the courts 
to include all equivalent constructions. Peripheral definition involves marking out 
the periphery or boundary of the area covered by the claim and holding as 
infringements only such constructions as lie within that area." 
ELLIS, supra note 99, at§ 4. 

